PAPER: “Institutional Corruption and Election Fraud: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan”
Institutional Corruption and Election Fraud: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan
By Michael Callen, University of California Los Angeles. Department of Political Science. 4289 Bunche Hall, Los Angeles, CA 90095; and, James D. Long, Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies and University of Washington. Department of Political Science.
Citation: Callen M, Long JD. Institutional Corruption and Election Fraud: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan. American Economic Review. Forthcoming.
Abstract: We investigate the relationship between political networks, weak institutions, and election fraud during the 2010 parliamentary election in Afghanistan combining: (i) data on political connections between candidates and election officials; (ii) a nationwide controlled evaluation of a novel monitoring technology; and (iii) direct measurements of aggregation fraud. We find considerable evidence of aggregation fraud in favor of connected candidates and that the announcement of a new monitoring technology reduced theft of election materials by about 60 percent and vote counts for connected candidates by about 25 percent. The results have implications for electoral competition and are potentially actionable for policymakers.
Download the paper at http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/michael-callen/files/institutional_corruption_2.pdf
By Michael Callen, University of California Los Angeles. Department of Political Science. 4289 Bunche Hall, Los Angeles, CA 90095; and, James D. Long, Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies and University of Washington. Department of Political Science.
Citation: Callen M, Long JD. Institutional Corruption and Election Fraud: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan. American Economic Review. Forthcoming.
Abstract: We investigate the relationship between political networks, weak institutions, and election fraud during the 2010 parliamentary election in Afghanistan combining: (i) data on political connections between candidates and election officials; (ii) a nationwide controlled evaluation of a novel monitoring technology; and (iii) direct measurements of aggregation fraud. We find considerable evidence of aggregation fraud in favor of connected candidates and that the announcement of a new monitoring technology reduced theft of election materials by about 60 percent and vote counts for connected candidates by about 25 percent. The results have implications for electoral competition and are potentially actionable for policymakers.
Download the paper at http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/michael-callen/files/institutional_corruption_2.pdf